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Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and
the First Amendment
Section 8(b)(4), the secondary boycott 1 provision of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA),2 has been described
as "one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal labor statute."3 Since its inception, "Section 8(b)(4) ... has
caused the [National Labor Relations] Board and the courts considerable consternation in drawing the line between primary and secondary activity and, moreover, in specifying the types of secondary
activity proscribed by the section."4
One persistent and vexing question for the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the courts has been the extent to which subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits picketing of secondary businesses as a
means of persuading consumers to boycott the products of a primary
employer.5 This provision does not literally prohibit picketing.
Rather, it declares that a union that "threaten[s], coerce[s], or re1. Unions resort to secondary boycotts to persuade customers patronizing a secondary
business not to buy goods produced by a primary employer with whom the union has a labor
dispute. A "secondary business" is one that deals in the primary employer's goods. This Note
deals with peaceful picketing at customer entrances of secondary businesses, through which a
union seeks public support and requests a boycott of the primary employer's products. The
Note uses the terms "consumer picketing" and "secondary consumer picketing" to describe
this activity. See generally A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 42-43 (2d ed. rev.
1977).
2. The section reads in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (4) . . . (ii}
is-

to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where •.. an object thereof

(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer or to
cease doing business with any other person, . . . : Provided, That nothing contained in
this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful . . . any primary strike or primary
picketing;

. . . Providedfurther, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer . . . .
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA}, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 704, 73 Stat. 519, 542-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)).
3. Aaron, 17ze .Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of1959, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1086, 1113 (1960).
4. Zimmerman, 17ze Changing Arsenal of Economic Weapons: Consequences for Section
8(b)(4), the Board and the Courts, 34 PROC. N.Y.U. CoNF. ON LAB. 79, 80 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Hoffman ex rel NLRB v. Cement Masons Local 337,468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical
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strain[s]" any person, with the object of compelling that person to
stop dealing with another, commits an unfair labor practice. A proviso then excepts "publicity, other than picketing" from the section's
coverage.6
The Supreme Court interpreted this language in NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits) .1 Union pickets had
asked customers of a supermarket not to purchase nonunion apples
on sale there. The Court avoided the first amendment questions that
strict application of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would have raised8 by rejecting the "negative inference" 9 that exclusion of picketing from the
proviso necessarily meant its inclusion as an unfair labor practice. 10
The Court held that consumer picketing limited to the struck product is "poles apart" from picketing that seeks to shut off all trade
with a secondary, 11 and therefore does not "threaten, coerce, or restrain" within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 12
Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as
moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
6. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1976); see note 2 supra.
7. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
8. 377 U.S. at 63 ("[Al broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guaran•
tees of the First Amendment."). The Court thus did not resolve the constitutionality of congressional restrictions on consumer picketing. However, Justice Powell later concluded
otherwise when he observed that ''the Court left no doubt that Congress may prohibit secondary picketing calculated 'to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary
employer.' 377 U.S., at 63." NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),
447 U.S. 607,616 (1980). But see St. Antoine,Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persist•
ing Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 883, 900 (1982) ("In fact, in the passage
quoted from Tree Fruits, the Court was merely stating what it thought Congress had and had
not done. The opinion was notably circumspect about prejudging the constitutionally allowable limits of restraints on peaceful consumer picketing.").
9. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 897.
IO. 377 U.S. at 69 ("(I]t does not follow from the fact that some coercive conduct was
protected by the proviso, that the exception 'other than picketing' indicates that Congress had
determined that all consumer picketing was coercive.").
11. 377 U.S. at 70.
12. 377 U.S. at 72-73. Justice Brennan explained that while secondary consumer picketing
might induce a secondary business to stop buying from the primary employer, that reaction
would follow from the falling demand for the struck product. He contrasted this situation with
one in which the pickets urge consumers not to patronize the secondary at all. In that case,
secondary employers might stop dealing with the primary employer not only because of reduced demand for the struck product, but also to "prevent the loss of sales of other products."
377 U.S. at 72 n.20. While the language of the statute arguably prohibits secondary picketing
in either instance, Justice Brennan concluded that a literal reading of the statute would contravene congressional intent. 377 U.S. at 72 (" '[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.'") (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1891)). Thus,
Tree Fruits is a statutory interpretation case that examines the threshold level of coercion
needed to make peaceful secondary picketing an unfair labor practice. See Mack & Lieber•
witz, Secondary Consumer Picketing: The First Amendment Questions Remain, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 815, 822-23 (1981).
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The Tree Fruits decision did not end uncertainty in the area, because the struck product in that case constituted only a small13 and
separable 14 portion of the secondary's retail sales. InNLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 15 however, the struck
product accounted for ninety percent of the picketed secondary employer's business. Although the Court had rejected an economic loss
test of coercion in Tree Fruits, 16 it held in Safeco that such picketing
"reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss [and] simply does not square with the language or
the purpose of§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)." 17 Although a majority of the Court
agreed that such a prohibition did not conflict with the first amendment, the justices were unable to agree on the constitutional basis
that justified regulation of picketing.
This Note examines both the statutory and constitutional implications of Safeco and Tree Fruits. It suggests that the confusion surrounding existing Board and court interpretations of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) stems from the Supreme Court's failure to assess realistically the impact that consumer picketing has on secondary businesses, as well as the Court's refusal to examine the objectives of
unions that resort to secondary picketing. 18
13. Tree Fruits did not foreclose the question whether§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited consumer
picketing of a secondary business that dealt substantially or exclusively in the primary's goods.
See 377 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The single-product retailer situation first arose in
Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), enforcement
denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). Dow Chemical
involved picketing of gas stations by striking refinery workers. The Board reasoned that
§ S(b)(4) prohibited consumer picketing that would discourage customers from buying any
tires and other automotive accessories from the stations. The Court of Appeals, in denying the
Board's application for enforcement, rejected the notion that the permissibility of picketing
turned on its economic impact and noted that "[w)hile the small part the struck product had in
the whole of the Safeway business was not overlooked by the Court [in Tree Fruits), it was not
the basis for the decision." 524 F.2d at 858.
14. Tree Fruits did not deal with situations in which the struck product or service was
inseparable from the rest of the secondary's business. The Board and the courts have fashioned a "merged products" doctrine prohibiting picketing in such cases. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Twin City Dist. Council, 422 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1970) (kitchen cabinets in new homes); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (bread in restaurant); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (advertising); NLRB v.
Building Serv. Employees Union Local 105,367 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1966) (janitorial service);
Laundry Workers lnt'l Union, Local No. 259, 164 N.L.R.B. 426 (1967) (laundry service); see
text at notes 145-48 infra.
15. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
16. 377 U.S. at 72 (''We disagree therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of 'to
threaten, coerce, or restrain' for the purposes of this case is whether [the secondary employer]
suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss.").
17. 447 U.S. at 614-15; see Mack & Lieberwitz, supra note 12, at 825.
18. Cf. Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Integrated Approach
to Labor Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 55, 56-57 (1965) ("In today's complex industrial order based upon
a myriad of relationships, . . . [w)e require a decision-making process with triangular vision .
. . . Today for the most part the study oflabor law is a study in fragmentation .... The legal
process by emphasizing isolated doctrines and isolated facts . . . is detached from the realities

1820

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1817

As a matter of statutory interpretation, one Board member has
observed that the Court's failure to formulate a principled basis for
its decisions in this area has produced a "convoluted statute that has
been muddied and distorted by judicial interpretation." 19 Part I explores this question by examining the legislative history of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Court's treatment of congressional intent in
Tree Fruits and Safeco. It concludes that Congress did not separately consider secondary consumer picketing in framing the section,
and that the overall congressional objective of balancing the interests
of unions and secondary businesses does not support the Safeco
holding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) automatically prohibits dominantproduct secondary picketing.20
As a matter of constitutional law, one commentator has written
that Safeco "comes close to being an unreasoned decision . . . . It is
constitutional law by fiat." 21 Scholars have repeatedly argued, on
the basis of both logic and precedent, that restrictions on peaceful
consumer picketing are constitutionally dubious.22 Part II of this
of the social process. . . . Labor law today has no shape and the Supreme Court has no
theory."); see notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text.
19. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 94.
20. Sefeco did not deal with single-product consumer picketing, but instead decided that
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited by its own language all secondary picketing directed against a primary product that dominated a secondary business, in disregard of whether the picketing had
any actual economic impact. The Court emphasized, however, that
the picketing in Tree Fruits and the picketing in this case are relatively extreme examples
of the spectrum of conduct that the Board and the courts will encounter in complaints
charging violations of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If secondary picketing were directed against a
product representing a major portion of a neutral's business, but sign!ftcantly less than that
represented by a single dominant product, neither Tree Fruits nor today's decision would
necessarily control. The critical question would be whether, by encouraging customers to
reject the struck product, the secondary appeal is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral
party with ruin or substantial loss. Resolution of the question in each case will be entrusted to the Board's expertise.
447 U.S. at 615 n.11 (emphasis added).
Essentially, this Note urges that the Board and the courts determine whether the secondary
picketing in question actually threatens "the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss" regardless of whether the struck product is a dominant or merely a major component of the
secondary's sales. This approach will accommodate congressional intent and the constitutional requirement that statutes implicating freedom of speech be narrowly drawn and advance a substantial government interest.
This Note adopts the Court's nomenclature and will refer to secondary picketing of a product that comprises a dominant part of the secondary's business as "dominant-product secondary picketing." This term encompasses fact situations similar to the one appearing in Sefeco,
as well as to single-product secondary picketing.
21. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 903.
22. See generally A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 46-47 (1981); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 433-49 (1970); Affeldt, supra note 18; Cox, Strikes, Picketing
and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951 ); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A JJlssenl,
56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech: Comes /he Evolution,
10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. l (1976); Jaffe, In JJefense of the Supreme Court's Picketing
Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1037 (1943); Jones, Picketing and Coercion, A Jurisprudence of
Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Jones, Epithets]; Jones, The Righi to
Picket-Twilight Zone ofthe Constitution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 995 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
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Note considers the constitutional theories that the Court relies on to
justify its conclusion that section 8(b)(4)(ii){B) prohibits picketing of
a dominant-product secondary, and attempts to reconcile the Court's
holding that Congress may, in appropriate circumstances, flatly prohibit such activity. 23 It concludes that the rationales underlying the
Court's holding in Safeco are constitutionally unsound because they
fail to consider the purposes and impact of consumer picketing.
In other instances in which the Court has reviewed selective restrictions on expression protected by the first amendment, it has required persuasive objective data showing that the restrictions were
narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest. 24 As
a result, Part III concludes that statutory and constitutional considerations demand that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) be construed to prohibit
peaceful consumer picketing only on a showing that such picketing
violates established time, place, and manner restrictions, or that it
will cause actual and substantial injury to the secondary business.
I.

"THREATEN, COERCE, OR RESTRAIN" STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN TREE FRUITS AND SAFECO

The view that picketing is inherently coercive is deeply engrained
Jones, Twilight Zone]; Kalven, The Concept ofthe Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP.
CT. REv. l; Mack & Lieberwitz,supra note 12; Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist:
Is There a Sofe Way to Picket Under the First Amendment?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Invisible Hand); Note, First Amendment Analysis ofPeaceful Picketing, 28 ME. L. REV. 203 (1976).
23. International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc., 456 U.S. 212,226 (1982) ("We
have consistently rejected the clainI that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of
8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment." (citing Safeco)). See NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982) (''This Court has recognized the strong
governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association. . . . Secondary boycotts
and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited ..•." (citing Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Safeco)).
Three more articles arguing that consumer picketing is indistinguishable from other forms
of constitutionally protected speech have appeared since the Court reiterated its Sofeco holding in Claiborne Hardware. See St. Antoine, supra note 8; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and
the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Peaceful Picketing]; Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the .Doctrine of
Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Picketing and Commercial
Speech]. Although the logic of this position is persuasive, this Note begins instead with the
premise that the Court is firm in its conviction that the Constitution permits legitimate legislative regulation of secondary consumer picketing. It then argues that the Court's conviction
should be applied on principled grounds informed by the realities of secondary consumer
picketing.
24. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (evidence of electrical rate inequities was not adequate to justify an energy conservation
regulation prohibiting utility company advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (insufficient evidence that prohibition of "For Sale" signs on real
estate was needed to prevent "white flight" from integrated neighborhood).
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in the history of the labor movement. 25 However, primary picketing
as a means of pressuring the primary employer in a labor dispute is
now protected by statute,26 and is acknowledged, albeit with reservations, as a form of constitutionally protected speech. 27 Nevertheless,
judicial hostility toward picketing of secondary employers in labor
disputes persists. 28 In Tree Fruits and Safeco, the Supreme Court
examined the legislative history of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to determine
whether Congress shared this opposition to peaceful consumer
picketing.
A.

Congressional Intent and Legislative History

In amending section 8(b)(4), Congress did not originally intend
to prohibit consumer picketing. 29 During the course of debate, some
25. See Jones, Epithets, supra note 22, at 1023-27; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 22,
at 1490-91.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976) provides in pertinent part "[t]hat nothing contained
in this clause . . . shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing."
21. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308,314 (1968) ("[N]o case decided by this Court can be found to support the proposition that the nonspeech aspects of peaceful picketing are so great as to render the provisions
of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether.") (dicta); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Affeldt,supra note 18, at 130-31 (''The Board is a two-headed monster. The General Counsel finds illegal group objectives from facts which the Board would not, yet the General Counsel has the sole power to issue complaints. . . . The power to issue complaints and
temporary injunctions at the initial stage of picketing is the power to resolve the entire
case. . . . There is strong evidence today that many trial examiners and regional directors
. . . are obtaining injunctions and deciding cases in defiance of established Board policy. Is it
any wonder that the law in this area is in a state of utter confusion?"); Fleming, Title VII: The
Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 666,692 (1960) ("It may, of course, be true that
picketing the retailer will put him out of business. Throughout our history such a result has
generally impressed the courts as unfair and wrong."); Waldman, Problems ofthe Boycott-A
Labor Viewpoint, 14 PROC. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 47, 66 (1961) (''This type of judicial hostility to boycotts goes back more than 50 years. In effect it represents an attitude that labor, in its
dispute with industry, should be denied the use of any weapons beyond those available in the
simple primary strike or primary picket line.").
29. Congressman Griffin did not mention secondary product picketing in discussing the
loopholes that the Landrum-Griffin Amendments were designed to correct. 105 CoNG. REc.
15531-32 (1959), reprinted in 2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1568 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEO. HIST.].
Consumer picketing was not illegal under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976), and
Congressman Griffin emphasized that "it is important to keep in mind that our substitute bill
would not change - it would only reinforce what was the intent of Congress at the time it
passed the Taft-Hartley Act." 105 CONG. REc. at 15531, 2 LEO. HIST. at 1568. The idea that
the provision should also ban consumer picketing seems to have been added later, suggested in
part by a reference to secondary picketing in a television address by President Eisenhower.
See 105 CONG. REc. at 19954, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1842-43 (television address of President Eisenhower); Cox, The Landrum-Gr{flin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 257, 274 (1959) (''There is some reason to think that originally the Republicans and
Southern Democrats among the House conferees failed to realize that the words were broad
enough to reach consumer boycotts and would have agreed to eliminate the prohibition, but
President Eisenhower's radio and television appearance placed them in a dile=a."); St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 896 ("Initially it appears that this new language was intended to cover
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legislators who were hostile to secondary activity of any kind did
propose amendments designed to restrict union secondary activity. 30
However, the legislative history suggests that few legislators considered whether section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would apply where peaceful consumer picketing was confined to a struck primary product. 31
Certainly the issue was never taken up by Congress as a whole.
In Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court held that this legislative history failed to "reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan
to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites." 32
The majority distinguished between picketing that sought to shut off
all trade with a secondary employer and that confined solely to the
struck product, holding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) permitted picketing of the latter type. 33 Although the Court conceded that this distinction was not "expressly alluded to in the debates," 34 it concluded
only physical coercion or economic threats by a union directly against a secondary employer,
which previously would not have been reached because no work refusals by employees were
involved. As a result of some rather bizarre backstage legislative maneuvers, however, it developed as part of the statutory history that the phrase 'threaten, coerce, or restrain' would
apply to at least some types of consumer boycotts." (footnotes omitted)).
30. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6666-71 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., mpra note 29, at
1193-98 (remarks of Senator McClellan and others on amendment to broaden proscription
against secondary boycotts, which was defeated).
31. See Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing - Following the Struck Product, 52 VA. L.
R.Ev. 189, 198 (1966) (Congress made "no serious attempts" to distinguish between picketing
designed to dissuade the public from buying the goods of a primary employer and picketing
that requested the public not to deal with a secondary employer at all.).
32. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
33. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7; see note 12 mpra and accompanying text.
14. 377 U.S. at 64. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that neither the plain language
nor the legislative history of§ 8(b)(4) supported the Court's distinction between limited and
general secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 82-92 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In particular, his review of the statutory history suggests that the legislators who discussed the Landrum-Griffin
bill assumed that it prohibited all secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 84-92. Justice Harlan's
arguments have proved persuasive to many of the commentators who have since written on the
subject. See, e.g., Zimmerman, mpra note 4, at 82; Note, Peaceful Picketing, mpra note 23, at
1473 n.31; Comment, Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 112, 120-24 (1979); Comment, Consumer Picketing ofEconomically Interdependent
Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN.
L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Interdependent Parties].
However, some of the passages that Justice Harlan relied on in his discussion of the legislative history are less convincing when taken in context. For example, he indicates that Senator
Humphrey, who opposed the provision, "feared" that the phrase "restrain and coerce" was
targeted at consumer picketing. 377 U.S. at 85 (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 6232 (1959), reprinted
in 2 LEG. HIST., mpra note 29, at 1037). Several paragraphs earlier, however, Senator
Humphrey had indicated that the effect of the amendment was not clear: "[I]fthe amendment
shall be adopted, it will be necessary to go through a whole series of court actions again, and
no one in the labor-management picture will know for many years where he stands." 105
CONG. REc. at 6232, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1037. Justice Harlan also refers to Senator Kennedy's
prepared comparison of the House and Senate bills. He deduces that because the House proposal would have precluded secondary picketing in certain situations, section 8(b)(4) must be
read to have a similar objective. However, the report cited by Justice Harlan goes on to assert
that prohibition of appeals to customers "is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression."
105 CONG. REc. at 16591, 2 LEG. HlsT. at 1708. This statement belies the notion that Congress
intended section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prohibit all secondary picketing.
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"that the consumer picketing carried on in this case is not attended
by the abuses at which the statute was directed." 35
Safeco adds another element to the Tree Fruits distinction: the
secondary's dependence on the primary employer's product. Although the Court relied on legislative history to develop this additional factor, the only support for its conclusion derives from a
remark made in defense of an amendment subsequently defeated by
the Senate. 36 Thus, the Safeco test further attenuates the link between the Court's statutory interpretation and the legislative history.
Absent reliable indicators of congressional intent, the Court
should focus on the policy goals that section 8(b)(4) advances. 37 The
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress sought to regulate
secondary activity38 with the "dual . . . objectives of preserving the
right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending
employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their
own." 39 Admittedly, some picketing is dangerous to neutrals because it is inherently coercive.40 But in Safeco the Court never assessed whether the consumer picketing in question actually
threatened, coerced, or restrained the secondary business.41 Instead,
based solely on the fact that the struck product dominated the secon35. 377 U.S. at 64.
36. 447 U.S. 607, 624 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The only fragment of legislative history the Court musters in support of its holding forbidding picketing of single product secon•
dary firms is Senator McClellan's expression of concern that some secondary firms may have
developed their business entirely on the basis of 'a particular brand of product.' . . . But that
remark was offered in support of a proposed amendment restricting secondary boycotts that
was rejected by the Senate. . . . Section 8(b)(4) as finally enacted was narrower than Senator
McClellan's proposed amendment." (citations omitted); see note 43 infra.
37. The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that meaning that
nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides us when circumstances not
plainly covered by the terms of a statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to which
Congress was committed. Care must be taken, however, to respect the limits up to which
Congress was prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a
statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing pressures of other
policies. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970).
38. Except for the proviso exempting "publicity, other than picketing," § 8(b)(4) broadly
addresses all secondary union activity. Peaceful consumer picketing that follows the struck
product is a form of secondary activity.
39. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951), quoted in
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 223 n.20 (1982).
40. Picketing involving violence or physical intimidation is certainly coercive. See, e.g.,
Milk.wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
Picketing that shuts off pick-ups and deliveries or servicing of a secondary business in violation
of the § 8(b)(4)(i)(B) prohibition against "inducement or encouragement" of workers might
also be described as coercive. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).
41. See note 45 infra and accompanying text; cf. Note, Picketing and Publicity Under Sec•
tion 8(b)(4) ofthe LMRA, 13 YALE L.J. 1265, 1280-81 (1964)("While it is likely that most non•
product picketing will in fact 'threaten, coerce, or restrain,' there might be some instances in
which it will not.'') [hereinafter cited as Note, Picketing and Publicity].
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dary's sales, the Court in effect conclusively presumed that secondary picketing in such cases can always "be expected to threaten [the
secondary employer] with ruin or substantial loss,"42 and that section
8(b)(4) therefore precluded such picketing as coercive. However, the
dual objectives embodied in congressional regulation of secondary
activity require a more careful balance.
B. The Delicate Balance -

Consumer Picketing and Neutral
Parties

The examples of secondary picketing that appear in the legislative history of the LMRDA typically include appeals to workers as
well as consumers.43 The actual impact of purely consumer picketing has been given little empirical or even anecdotal scrutiny,44 and
has not been considered by the Board or the courts in their doctrinal
analysis of the cases before them. 45 Because Congress designed section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to balance the interests oflabor unions and secondary employers,46 the courts should weigh the value of consumer
picketing as a means to influence a primary employer against the
actual impact that such picketing has on an affected secondary business. Section 8(b)(4) should be read to prohibit consumer picketing
only when the actual harm to the secondary outweighs the union's
legitimate interest in influencing the primary employer.
42. 447 U.S. at 614; see Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252,
1264 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Reading Tree Fruits in combination with [Sefeco ], we infer that a
consumer boycott of a neutral business will 'threaten, coerce, or restrain' the neutral if it either
exceeds the scope of the union's primary campaign or will foreseeably cause 'ruin or substantial loss' to the neutral." (emphasis in original)).
43. Senator McClellan's example concerning picketing of a merchant who has built a business around one product, cited by Justice Powell inSefeco, 447 U.S. at 615 n.10, includes both
interference with deliveries and a misleading picket sign (neither of these elements are noted in
Justice Powell's opinion):
The union may say to the merchant, "You cannot sell this product. If you do we will
picket your place of business. Thus you will not be able to get your supplies, because the
Teamsters will not cross the picketline."
In addition, the merchant's customers . . . would see the picket sign. What would the
sign say? It would say "Unfair to Labor."
105 CONG. R.E.c. 6667 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at 1194; see note 36
supra.
44. See Brinker & Taylor, The Secondary Boycott Maze, 25 LAB. L.J. 418, 426 (1974).
45. Neither the Board nor the court in Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical
Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 694 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as
moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), took into account the actual impact that the union's picketing had
on the secondary businesses involved. Similarly, the Board heard Sefeco on a set of stipulated
facts. See Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754
(1976), revd., 627 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1979), revd., 441 U.S. 607 (1980). Safeco did not claim
that the secondary title companies had in fact suffered substantial loss, nor did the Supreme
Court require a showing that the picketing had caused an actual injury. q. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 316 (1962) ("[T]he record does not show any injury
to Safeway, the secondary employer. Indeed, Tree Fruits, not Safeway, is the charging party
here."), qffd. on other grounds, 337 U.S. 58 (1964).
46. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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A realistic view of secondary picketing indicates that the union's
appeal is closely associated with the primary dispute. 47 The main
purpose of such picketing is not to hurt the primary by cutting off
sales at the secondary site, but rather to threaten the primary employer's public image by attracting attention to the dispute. 48 This
conclusion is supported by the fact that even where the primary
product is sold nationally, secondary consumer picketing typically is
often restricted to the vicinity of the primary dispute. 49
Another indication that the major value of consumer picketing
lies in its publicity effect is the fact that picketed secondary businesses usually account for an insignificant portion of the primary's
total sales. 50 Thus, unions have little to gain by causing or threatening harm to the secondary employer, who has little leverage with
which to influence the resolution of the primary dispute.
In fact, consumer picketing rarely discourages large numbers of
customers from purchasing the struck product. 51 The image of the
47. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 337 U.S. 58, 72 (1964) ("When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck product, the
union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute."); see Engel, supra note 31, at 200-09
(suggesting that principles of common site picketing be extended to following primary products as well as primary employees to the secondary site).
48. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
267, 283 (1941) ("Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication."); Comment, The Landrum-Grf/lin Amendments: Labor's Use ofSecondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
724, 730-31 (1960) ("[O]rganized labor has consistently maintained that this picketing is
designed solely to advertise to the public the sale of 'unfair' goods . . . ."); cf. Velvel, Freedom
of Speech and the .Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 KAN. L. REV. 149, 153 (1968) ("Burning a
draft card, like engaging in a civil rights demonstration, is the ordinary man's way of attracting
the attention of the national news media and, through the media, of getting his views across to
citizens at large.").
Secondary picketing designed to attract public attention affects the primary dispute because
corporations are increasingly concerned with cultivating their "public image." See Miller,
Sprucing Up the Corporate Image, INDUSTRY WEEK, Aug. 23, 1982, at 35, 35. ''{Gjood public
relations usually is taken for gn\.nted; it is when trouble strikes that poor PR gets notice - and
inflicts damage." Id. at 41 (emphasis in original); Note, Invisible Hand, supra note 22, at 187.
49. Although Safeco Title Insurance Co. had "61 principal company offices and over 650
agents in 38 states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands," SAFECO CORP.,
1978 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (1979), picketing in that case was confined to 5 Seattle title companies local to the dispute. 447 U.S. at 609. In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir.
1980), striking workers of the Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Co. picketed two supermarkets
in Ludlow and Covington, Kentucky, the homes of the struck primary's factories.
50. Safeco Corp. in 1978 had operating revenue in excess of Sl billion, and assets of over
$2 billion. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. The Title Insurance division had pre-tax
earnings of approximately $18 million. Id. at 24. The Duro Company, supra note 49, has
plants in Tampa, Florida, Brownsville, Texas, and Hudson, Wisconsin, as well as the two
factories in Kentucky. 10 THOMAS REGISTER OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS AND THOMAS
REGISTER CATALOG FILE 559 (1982). Duro's bag sales to the two struck supermarkets were
undoubtedly a minute portion of its total sales.
51. See A. REES, supra note 1, at 43; Cook, Boycott/ Labor's Last Resort, INDUSTRY
WEEK, June 28, 1976, at 23, 31; Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 22.
Facts gleaned from cases holding that secondary consumer picketing is coercive bear out
the minimal economic impact that such picketing usually produces. In Local 140S5, United
Steelworkers (Dow Chemical Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 694 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853
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powerful labor union wantonly ruining secondary businesses is
largely a myth. 52 Moreover, because boycotts are usually a last resort in a labor dispute, the union may have as much to lose as the
primary or secondary employers involved. 53 In short, secondary
picketing does not always pose a serious economic threat to secondary employers.
This low level of actual injury must be weighed against the importance that secondary picketing has to a union involved in a primary dispute. Consumer picketing is an excellent way to attract
media attention to the dispute. 54 Because of increased interrelationship among businesses,55 declines in union membership, 56 and re(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), the effect of secondary picketing on
retail gas stations was slight. None went out of business. Dow refused to negotiate with the
union and no contract with the union was ever signed. Some of the striking employees returned to Dow on salary, others never returned at all. After the Board enjoined the union's
picketing, the local was disbanded. Telephone interview with Bill Wittbrodt, Staff Representative, Bay City Sub-District of District 29, United Steelworkers (Sept. 27, 1982).
In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980), the court held that striking workers
of Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Co., by picketing Kroger supermarkets to request that customers refuse to have their groceries packed in struck bags, had engaged in an unfair labor
practice. The court held that the bags were integrated into Kroger's business, and in the absence of a practically available alternative, customers would boycott Kroger entirely. One
supermarket had 2800 customers during two days of picketing; 85 requested boxes and 70 were
accommodated. At a second store, out of 1500 customers, 65 requested boxes and 30 were
accommodated. Most of the customers who were not given boxes took out their purchases in
the struck bags. A few customers brought their own bags. One customer left without paying
for her groceries after they were packed in the "scab bags." The court characterized the figures
as showing that the supermarkets only had enough boxes to accommodate 2½% of their customers, and reasoned that, if the boycott had been totally successful, Kroger would have suffered substantial losses.
In Safeco, employees went on strike on November 18, 1974. Picketing of the title search
companies commenced February 19, 1975. The impact on the title insurance companies was
minimal; none went out of business. No contract with the union was ever signed. Telephone
interview with Jim Webster, Attorney of Record for the Union in Safeco (Sept. 29, 1982). See
also note 107 infra.
.
Thus, available evidence suggests that the Court's presumption in Safeco, that secondary
picketing of the single-product retailed "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties
with ruin or substantial loss," 447 U.S. at 614, is probably mistaken.
52. As illustrated by Safeco and Dow Chemical, the union locals engaged in picketing are
usually underdogs. Moreover, the prohibitions on interference with secondary employees effectively prevent unions from shutting down secondary businesses. See A. REES, supra note I,
at 42.
53. See Cook, supra note 51, at 28; Boycott af GE goods may prolong strike, Bus. WEEK,
Nov. 29, 1969, at 32, 33.
54. q: Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommodation af Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 983, 1008 (1982) (picketing will attract
some media coverage, although a boycott would be more likely to receive sustained coverage);
notes 47-50 supra.
55. This interrelationship manifests itself in a number of ways. First, corporate acquisitions and mergers are increasing. See Note, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity
Under the NLRA, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 237 n.98 (1980); Merger Fever Unabated, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1982, § 3, at 22, col. 3; Wayne, The Corporate Raiders, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1982, § 6 (Magazine). Many secondary businesses held by larger corporations will thus have
greater staying power if subject to consumer picketing. See Note, supra at 239.
Second, since the passage of the LMRDA in 1959, the number of franchise-type arrange-
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duced union bargaining leverage,57 the public exposure generated by
secondary picketing is essential to preserve the balance of power in
labor management relations. Therefore, in order to accommodate
the economic interests of affected neutrals with the union's right to
pressure offending primary employers, the courts should conclude
that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits consumer picketing only when
the plaintiff employer can show that the secondary business has actually suffered substantial economic harm. This approach would advance the policy objectives underlying section 8(b)(4), and would
also provide a realistic, 58 narrow statutory interpretation that would
be less likely to impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom of
expression.
II.

"PUBLICITY, OTHER THAN PICKETING" - CONTENT,
CONDUCT AND THE CONSTITUTION

With the Supreme Court's decision in Thornhill v. Alabama ,59
ments has skyrocketed. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING I (1978). This circumstance is particularly significant because the dominant-product retailer situation addressed in Safeco will most
often involve a franchise relationship of some type. Because franchisees are "locked into" the
franchisor, the choice that Justice Powell claimed was being forced upon the title insurance
companies "between their survival and the severance of their ties with Safeco," 447 U.S. at
615, simply does not exist. In both Sqfeco and J)ow Chemical, the secondary businesses had
contractual obligations to deal exclusively with the primary employers. See also Bennett v.
Local 456, Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, 459 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (picketing
secondary businesses that were franchises obligated to purchase their supplies from primary).
Picketing a secondary that is contractually obligated to deal only with the primary is arguably
outside the literal prohibition of the statute - coercion to force one party to cease doing
business with another - because the terms of the contract between the parties preclude cessation of the relationship.
56. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE 81-446,
CORRECTED DATA ON LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP-1980, 1-3 (Sept. 18, 1981); U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND
EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979, 59-60 (1980) (union membership as percentage of total labor
force declining).
57. See R. Berenbeim, Labor Unions: Where Are They Heading? I in SHOULD THE FED•
ERAL GOVERNMENT CURTAIL THE POWERS OF LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES?, H.R.
Doc. No. 89, 97th 'Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1981); Waldman, supra note 28, at 66; Zimmerman,
supra note 4, at 79, 93. Compare Sarnoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full Circle" and
"Formal Surrender", 9 LAB. L.J. 889, 901 (1958) ("In part this is a reflection upon the ex•
panding power oflabor organizations. • . . The Thornhill period has passed."), with Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 93 ("The technological, economic and political age in which we now live
is markedly different from that in which Congress enacted Section 8(b)(4) in 1947 and
amended in 1959.").
58. Cf. International Bhd. ofT-eamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1950)
("In [Swing, Wohl andAngelos ,] we held only that a State could not proscribe picketing merely
by setting artificial bounds, unreal in the light of modern circumstances, to what constitutes an
industrial relationship or a labor dispute." (emphasis added)); Jones, Twilight Zone, supra note
22, at 1007 ("Although some may feel that to be no more than a judicial flourish, the writer
thinks it quite candidly states what has moved the Court . . . ."); cf. G. CALABRESI, A COM•
MON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (suggesting that courts revise statutes in accordance with changed conditions to prevent "statutorification").
59. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Although the holding was a narrow one, see St. Antoine, supra
note 8, at 885-86, the Court clearly indicated in the companion case, Carlson v. California, 310
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peaceful picketing assumed a place among the forms of expression
protected by the first amendment. In subsequent years, however, the
Court retreated from its position in Thornhi!l 60 in a series of cases
permitting state injunctions against picketing. 61 Tree Fruits avoided
the first amendment implications of "a broad ban against peaceful
picketing," 62 but checked the erosion of the Thornhill doctrine.
Tree Fruits, however, faileoro clarify the-confusiong~ner_~teclby
the intervening decisions' unsystematic attempts63 to identify the circumstances under which peaceful secondary picketing deserved less
than complete first amendment protection. 64 In Safeco, the Court
U.S. 106 (1940), that Thornhill established that peaceful picketing is a means of communication protected by the first amendment:
The carrying of signs and banners . . . is a natural and appropriate means of conveying
information on matters of public concern. . . . For the reasons set forth in our opinion in
Thornhill . . . , publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, . . . must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is
secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state.
310 U.S. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
60. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, characterized the series of decisions following
Thornh,11 as a realization by the Court "that the broad pronouncements, but not the specific
holding, of Thornhill had to yield 'to the impact of facts unforeseen,' or at least not sufficiently
appreciated." 354 U.S. at 289. Dissenting, Justice Douglas lamented that "[t)he Court has
now come full circle. . . . The retreat became a rout . . . . Today, the Court signs the formal
surrender." 354 U.S. at 295-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing to pressure employer to force its employees to join union); Local Union No. 10, United
Assn. of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing to pressure contractor to eliminate nonunion men from job); Building Serv. Employees Intl. Union, Local 262 v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (picketing to pressure employer to recognize union rejected by
employees as bargaining representative); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to force business run by owner without employees to become
union shop); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (picketing to force supermarket to
hire minority employees); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948) (picketing to force business not to sell to nonunion distributors); Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local
No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (picketing of restaurant whose owner was having
unrelated construction performed by nonunion labor).
In Vogt, Justice Frankfurter reviewed these decisions in detail. He concluded that, while
Thornhill continued to stand for the proposition that "blanket prohibitions against picketing"
would be unacceptable, 354 U.S. at 294-99, "a state, in enforcing some public policy, whether
of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could
constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." 354
U.S. at 293. Justice Douglas, however, pointed out in dissent that, "for practical purposes,''
Justice Frankfurter's approach left "[s]tate courts and state legislatures . . . free to decide
whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any reason." 354 U.S. at 297
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens echoed this point in Safeco when he cautioned that if
speech could be restricted "simply because it is in furtherance of objectives deemed unlawful
by Congress . . . the First Amendment would place no limit on Congress' power." 447 U.S. at
618 (Steven, J., concurring).
62. 377 U.S. at 63; see notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
63. See Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 593 (1951)
("[A)lthough the term 'picketing' is used over and over again in Supreme Court opinions as if
it described a single type of conduct, in my judgment the course of decision will not be clarified
until the Court analyzes the facts more closely.").
64. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text..
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fared no better at finding a common constitutional rationale to justify section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)'s limitations on secondary picketing. Six
justices proposed three different theories, none of which commanded
a majority of the Court. 65
A.

Unlawful Object

Writing for the Court in Safeco, Justice Powell quickly dismissed66 the decision's potential constitutional infirmities. 67 He argued that picketing calculated to persuade customers not to deal
with the secondary employer68 "spreads labor discord by coercing a
neutral party to join the fray." 69 He concluded that the congressional prohibition on "'picketing in furtherance of [such] unlawful
objectives' did not offend the First Amendment."70
An ''unlawful object," however, must be more than a mere label71 attached to ''the otherwise lawful expression of views in a par65. In addition, Justice Brennan dissented, sidestepping the first amendment issue as he
had in Tree Fruits by emphasizing that secondary picketing confined to the struck product was
really primary in nature. 447 U.S. at 619-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. See 447 U.S. at 616.
Justice Blackmun described Justice Powell's one paragraph treatment of the constitutional
question as a "cursory discussion of . . . difficult First Amendment issues." 447 U.S. at 616
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was also dissatisfied, observing that "[t]he constitutional issue ... is not quite as easy as the plurality would make it seem." 447 U.S. at 618
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 900 ("Justice Powell ... discussed this constitutional question in a single paragraph. This hardly seems adequate for
resolving the conundrums bequeathed us by forty years of litigation and debate over the constitutional status of picketing." (footnote omitted)).
_67. This part of the opinion was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart and Justice
Rehnquist. 447 U.S. at 609.
68. See notes 13-14Sllpra.
69. 447 U.S. at 616.
70. 447 U.S. at 616 (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694,
705 (1951)). Justice Powell also cites American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U.S. 215
(1974), and International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), for
this proposition. Electrical Workers and American Radio, however, both involved appeals to
secondary employees to cease work; Vogt involved a Teamsters' picket line designed to coerce
an employer to force its employees to join the Teamsters Union. Justice Powell fails to note
"that Safeco was the first time the Supreme Court had ever clearly sustained a ban on peaceful
and orderly picketing addressed to, and calling for seemingly lawful responses by, individual
consumers acting on their own." St. Antoine, Sllpra note 8, at 901;
For a somewhat cynical explanation of the Court's analysis in Safeco, see Note, Peaceful
Picketing, S11pra note 23, at 1481 (''The unlawful objective theory ..• all~ws legislatures to
proscribe any picketing that is aimed at harming business_property, whil~g lip service to
the requirements of the first amendment doctrine developea.fu~11!,0ry.").
71. See NAACP v. Button, 317 U.S. 415 (1963), where the Court responded to "the contention that 'solicitation' is wholly outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment" by observing that
a state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels . . . .
(A]bstract discussion is not the only species of co=unication which the Constitution
protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends,
against governmental intrusion.
371 U.S. at429; cf. Mack & Lieberwitz,Sllpra note 12, at 819 (in Safeco, the Court ''went so far

f
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ticular manner and at a particular location."72 Nor is a legislative
conclusion that picketing is always coercive and therefore unlawful
sufficient.73 As Justice Stevens observed inSqfeco, acceptance of the
syllogism that secondary picketing has an unlawful object simply because Congress has so declared means that "the First Amendment
would place no limit on Congress' power."74
Picketing may, of course, be prohibited if it has an unlawful objective independent of the expression itself. In Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co. ,75 for example, a union representing ice peddlers
picketed in an effort to persuade Empire not to sell ice to nonunion
peddlers. If Empire had refused to sell, its action would have violated state antitrust laws.76 In contrast, the only unlawful aspect of
the union's activity in Safeco was the act of picketing itself. Consumer picketing is unlawful "only in a Pickwickian sense,"77 because
neither the content of the union's appeal nor the response of the consumers is itself unlawful.78
Concurring in Tree Fruits, Justice Black, the author of Giboney,
explained this key distinction. Section 8(b)(4) differs from Giboney,
in which picketers were forbidden "to help carry out an unlawful or
criminal undertaking," becaJ1se .the section "contain1La_prc>Viso
which says that it sh~-not be construed 'to prohibit publicity,_9Jger
than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully-advising-the-public,...including consumers . . . that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom . . . [the picketers have] a primary dispute.' " 79 Justice Black concluded that selective restrictions based on
as to defer to state control when the unlawful objective had not even been enunciated in the
form of legislation"); Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 942-43.
72. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. See, e.g., 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 105, 166 A.2d 271, 276 (1960) ("[A] state
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, enjoin picketing which in a particular case has
an objective which violates a legitimate clearly-defined law or public policy of the state. A
state may not, however, constitutionally equate picketing itself with coercion or with a violation of state policy.").
74. 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring); see note 60 supra; cf. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 297 (1957).
75. 336 U.S. 490 (1948).
76. "Thus all of appellants' activities - their powerful transportation combination, their
patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their
union membership, their publicizing - constituted a single and integrated course of conduct,
which was in violation of Missouri's valid law." 336 U.S. at 498.
77. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF Exl'RESSION 45 (1981).
78. In effect, Safeco begs the question by equating picketing with illegal conduct. See
Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, at 1479.
79. 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring). Cf. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55
(1964) ("The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions' freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded."); 105 CONG.
REc. 15673 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at 1615 (remarks of Rep. Griffin)
("Of course, this bill and any other bill is limited by the constitutional right of free speech.");
id. at 17899, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1432 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("[T]he union can hand out
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the content of the picketers' message constituted censorship of ideas
rather than regulation of conduct:
In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because
the picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in
which all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we
have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when
the picketers express particular views. The result is an abridgment of
the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a
labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by
the First Amendment. 80

Justice Black soon repeated these views in a nonlabor picketing case,
Cox v. Louisiana .8 1
The Court adopted Justice Black's position in Police .Department
v. Mosley, 82 and reaffirmed it in Carey v. Brown, 83 decided the same
day as Safeco. In those cases, regulations prohibiting all but labor
picketing in particular locations were held unconstitutional as content based restrictions on expression. 84 Justice Blackmun pointed
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over
the radio . . . .").
80. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring),
Justice Black addressed the constitutional issue in his concurrence because he agreed with
Justice Harlan's conclusion in dissent that the legislative history indicated a congressional intent to prohibit all secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring), The LMRDA
does not merely distinguish labor from nonlabor picketing. It also permits certain forms of
labor picketing, depending on the message of the picketers' appeal. A proviso to§ 8(b){7)(C)
permits picketing "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that
an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization." 29
U.S.C. § l58(b)(7)(C) (1976). Thus, the statute permits a union to ask customers not to patron•
ize a business employing nonunion labor, but does not allow the union to ask customers not to
buy from a business selling struck goods. See also Soft Drink Workers Local 812 v. NLRB,
657 F.2d 1252, 1272 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) {Wald, J., dissenting); 105 CONG, REC, at 17899, 2
LEG. HlsT., supra note 29, at 1432 (dialogue between Senators Goldwater and Kennedy)
("buy-America" campaigns not covered by§ 8(b)(4)).
81. [B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication oflabor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on
its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people
whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to
be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).
82. 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972).
83. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
84. In Cox, the Court overturned convictions under statutes prohibiting breach of the
peace, obstructing public passages, Cox I, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), and courthouse picketing, Cox
II, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). Justice Black concurred in Cox I, in part because the obstruction
statute excepted labor picketing. 379 U.S. at 580 (Black, J., concurring) ("I believe that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments require that if the streets of a town are open to some views,
they must be open to all."). He dissented in Cox II because the statute, for the legitimate
purpose of protecting judicial integrity, proscribed courthouse picketing by "anyone, under
any conditions." 379 U.S. at 581-84 (Black, J., dissenting). In Mosley and Carey, statutes that
prohibited picketing in order to prevent disturbances of schools and residential neighborhoods
contained exceptions for labor picketing. The Court treated these cases as equal protection
problems. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975). The Court concluded that the justifications proffered by the City of
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out that the Court in Safeco failed to explain why "[section]
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) imposes no impermissible restrictions upon constitutionally protected speech" 85 in light of Mosley and Carey. In short,
the use of the unlawful object test to justify section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)'s
purported prohibition of single-product secondary picketing arguably creates an impermissible content-based regulation. 86

B. Substantial Government Interest
Even if the first amendment does protect labor picketing by precluding content-based regulation, statutory control may still be justiChicago in Mosley (that "as a class, nonlabor picketing is more prone to produce violence than
labor picketing," Mosley, 408 U.S. at HJO), and the State of Illinois in Carey (that a resident
has " 'waived' his right to be free from picketing with respect to disputes arising out of the
employment relationship," Carey, 447 U.S. at 468) were insufficient to justify selective restrictions on protected expression. Because the statutes were not narrowly drawn to accomplish
their purposes, they were impermissibly over- and under-inclusive. See Mosely, 408 U.S. at 95
n.3; Carey, 447 U.S. at 465 n.9 (citing Kalven, supra note 22, at 29); cf. Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (antipicketing ordinance, virtually identical to that in Mosley,
held invalid; but antinoise ordinance, prohibiting noisy disturbance adjacent to school while
school is in session, held valid); Karst, supra, at 37-38 ("[The city faces] an apparent dile=a.
If [it] bars all picketing within a certain area, it will effectively discriminate against those
groups that can co=unicate to their audience only by picketing within that area. But if the
city adjusts its ordinance to this differential impact, as by providing a student-picketing or
labor-picketing exemption, ... [it runs] afoul of Mosley itself. The city can avoid the dile=a by amending the ordinance to ban not all picketing but only noisy picketing.").
85. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616;see 447 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]his case
fails to take account of the effect of this Court's decision in [Mosley] on the question whether
the National Labor Relations Act's content-based ban on peaceful picketing of secondary employers is constitutional. The failure to take Mosley into account is particularly ironic given
that the Court today reaffirms and extends the principles of that case in Carey v.
Brown . . . ."); cf. 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T)his is another situation in
which regulation of the means of expression is predicated squarely on its content.").
In Carey, the Court cited Professor Emerson for the proposition that ''non-labor picketing
is more akin to pure expression than labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions." Carey, 447 U.S. at 466 (citing T. EMERSON, supra note 22, at 444-49). Professor
Emerson, however, uses "labor'' and "non-labor picketing" as terms of art, connoting whether
the picketing seeks to persuade the general public or to coerce union members:
Not all labor picketing can be described as action. It may, as in the Fruit and Vegetable
Packers case, be similar in its impact to non-labor picketing and classified as expression. . . . Thus expression designed to persuade customers, to put pressure on automobile dealers, to convince General Motors, to refuse to advertise on a radio station . . .
would be protected . . . . Likewise, the fact that the objective of the economic pressure
was contrary to "public policy" . . . would not be grounds for restriction.
T. EMERSON, supra note 22, at 445, 449.
86. Picketing of retail businesses may not involve a labor dispute at all, but may be a
protest by consumers. See, e.g., Concerned Consumers League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (informational picketing in front of furniture store by consumer organization
protesting objectionable business practices); 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271
(1961) (residents protesting transfer of liquor license to neighborhood tavern picketed the tavern). Although the business involved is harmed in either case, nonlabor picketing is protected
by the first amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409
(1982). Thus, the justification for the ban on dominant-product secondary picketing - protecting neutral businesses - is undercut in the same way that the policy justifications in Cox,
Mosley, and Carey were upset by labor exceptions to general prohibitions on picketing.
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fled if it directly advances a substantial government interest. 87 This
conclusion is especially important as applied to labor activities because the "Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association." 88
But even economic regulations are closely examined. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 89 decided the
same day as Safeco, provides a good example of the scrutiny with
which the Court reviews content-based restrictions on commercial
speech. A Public Service Commission regulation on electric utility
advertising prohibited "promotional" advertising while permitting
"institutional and informational advertising." 90 The Commission
argued that its interest in energy conservation justified the restriction. Although the case dealt with commercial speech, an area receiving less than full first amendment protection,91 the Court struck
down the regulation after placing a heavy burden of justification on
the Commission. "In the absence of authoritativefindings to the contrary, we must credit as within the realm ofpossibility that electric
heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances." 92 Thus,
without objective data that the regulation was needed in all cases in
order to achieve its purpose, the Court found a blanket restriction
unconstitutional. If the actual impact of consumer picketing on secondary businesses was subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as
the Court applied in Central Hudson, the constitutional validity of
the Court's reading of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in Safeco would be cast
into serious doubt.
Admittedly, the Court might pay greater deference to Congress
than the New York Public Service Commission in scrutinizing an
asserted "substantial government interest." Indeed, Justice Blackmun concurred "reluctantly" in Safeco because he was hesitant to
87. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); accord, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982). In characterizing "the quality of the governmental
interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compel•
ling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong." United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
88. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982). Citing Safeco, the
Court indicated that secondary picketing was included among the economic activities that
Congress has a strong interest in regulating. 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
89. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
90. 447 U.S. at 558-61.
91. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) ("In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment pro•
tection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms . . • . Even if the
differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, . . • they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary.••."); cf. Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) ("[T]he overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.").
92. 447 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added).
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hold section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unconstitutional in light of the "substantial government interests" involved in the balance struck by Congress between ''union freedom of expression and the ability of
neutral employers, employees and consumers to remain free from
coerced participation in industrial strife." 93 Nevertheless, the interest asserted by Justice Blackmun in Safeco is virtually unsupportable. First, Congress evidently did little actual ''weighing" of the
relative interests that unions and secondary businesses have in
peaceful consumer picketing.94 Second, the relative bargaining
power of labor and management has shifted in favor of the latter
since passage of the LMRDA in 1959.95 Third, no empirical data
demonstrates that such picketing has a significant impact on secondary businesses;96 to the contrary, existing evidence indicates that
consumer picketing is not likely to have such an impact.97 These
considerations minimize the purported "substantial" government interest in regulating dominant-product secondary picketing.
Even where a substantial governmental interest is present, the
Court has required that any regulations with first amendment implications be "narrowly drawn" in order to advance directly the interest
being served.98 In Safeco, the Court ruled that once a secondary
employer's dependence on the primary's product reached a certain
level,99 the state's interest in preserving the neutrality of the secondary justified an automatic ban on peaceful consumer picketing
aimed at the struck product. In particular instances, satisfactory
proof that peaceful consumer picketing significantly injured a secondary employer might constitute a substantial government interest 100
93. Sefeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. Professor Cox, who assisted Senator
Kennedy during debates on the bill, has suggested that, rather than carefully weighing interests, legislators who had not realized that the bill reached consumer picketing only acquiesced
to such a reading as a matter of political convenience after a television address by President
Eisenhower raised the issue. Cox, supra note 29, at 274.
95. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
98. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 564-66
(1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) ("The Equal Protection Clause requires
that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate
objectives.").
99. In Sefeco, the secondaries derived over 90% of their gross incomes from the sale of the
primary product. Sefeco, 447 U.S. at 609.
100. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972) ("Predictions about imminent
disruption from picketing involve judgments appropria~ely made on an individualized basis,
not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter."); Note, Picketing and Publicity,supra note 41, at 1281 (suggesting that the Court of Appeals' standard in Tree
Fruits, requiring an actual showing that "a substantial economic impact on the secondary has
occurred or is likely to occur,'' Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311,
317 (D.C. Cir. 1962), ajfd. on other grounds, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), is the appropriate test for
"actual coercion").
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in prohibiting such picketing. Given the real objectives and impact
of consumer picketing, however, Safeco's categorical prohibition of
dominant-product secondary picketing renders section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
overbroad.
C. Speech-Plus
The Supreme Court has often attempted to distinguish picketing
from other forms of first amendment expression on the ground that it
is part speech and part conduct. This "speech-plus" concept of picketing originated in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Bakery
.Drivers Local No. 802 v. Wohl. 101 He observed that "the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."102 Justice Stevens based his concurrence in Safeco on this
argument, observing that, "[i]n the labor context, it is the conduct
element rather than the particular idea being expressed that often
provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to
enter a business establishment." 103
Where the government has regulated the conduct element of an
activity also involving speech, the Court has required that the regulation shield as much as possible the communicative aspect of the
activity. 104 In the case of peaceful secondary picketing, any effect
attributable to the conduct rather than the communicative element is
so incidental that it is outweighed by the first amendment interests at
stake. 105
The conventional notion of signal picketing, in which the picket
101. 315 U.S. 769 (1942). Justice Douglas explicitly uses the term "speech-plus" to de•
scribe picketing in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
102. 315 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring); accord International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284,289 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,465
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949).
103. Sefeco, 441 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
(A] government regulation is sufficiently justified ifit is within the constitutional power of
the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
See also note 98 supra.
105. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964) ("[I]t is
urged, all picketing automatically provokes the public to stay away from the picketed establishment. The public will, it is said, neither read the signs and handbills, nor note the explicit
injunction that 'This is not a strike against any store or market.' Be that as it may, our holding
today simply takes note of the fact that Congress has never adopted a broad condemnation of
peaceful picketing . . . .");cf.Lesnick, The Gravamen ofthe Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L,
RE.v. 1363, 1412-14 (1962) (suggesting that incidental economic harm from a secondary activity which would also be a by-product of successful primary activity should not be prohibited;
only "harms of a different kind" such as interference with employees or service and customer
access should be subject to restrictions).
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line is inviolable to union members and is backed by threats of fines
or expulsion, is inapposite to the facts of Sefeco. 106 Consumers who
are nonunion members will not respond to such sanctions. And, although secondary picket lines are "[t]heoretically . . . entitled to the
same respect from union members as any other picket line, . . . as a
practical matter the union's sanctions play little part. . . . [U]nion
members feel freer to exercise the freedom of choice open to the general public." 107
In Tree Fruits, Justice Harlan suggested three ways in which the
labor picket line may have a "signal-like" effect on consumers unrelated to the content of its appeal. 108 The first is ideological. The
customer automatically responds to the picket line because of union
sympathies, rather than the persuasiveness of the appeal in the particular dispute. The second is by intimidation. The customer, wishing to avoid confrontation with the picketers, simply chooses to shop
elsewhere. 109 The last signal effect results from the public's inability
to "ascertain the precise scope of a particular picketing operation."110 The consumer sees a picket line from a distance and,
presuming a primary labor dispute, avoids the business, never ascertaining the limited scope of the picketers' appeal. 111 Each of these
arguments is unrealistic, constitutionally flawed, or both.
The ideological "automatic response to a signal, rather tha.u a
reasoned response to an idea," 112 is the least satisfactory basis, both
106. See A. Cox,supra note 77, at 47 ("In Local 1001, the picketing was neither threatening nor a signal setting in motion a prearranged combination to exercise concerted economic
power backed by fear of union discipline . . . .").
107. Id. at 46; see also Raskin, Is the Picket Line Obsolete?, SAT. REV./WORLD, Oct. 19,
1974, at 12, 15 (picketing by union engaged in jurisdictional dispute) ("The pickets kept
marching year after frustrating year without interrupting flights or noticeably discouraging
patronage. Among Eastem's passengers, especially on its Washington-New York shuttle, were
many top officers of the AFL-CIO.").
108. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 82-83 (1964)
(Harlan, J ., dissenting):
Because of the very nature of picketing there may be numbers of persons who will refuse
to buy at all from a picketed store, (1) either out of economic or social conviction or
(2) because they prefer to shop where they need not brave a picket line. Moreover, (3) the
public can hardly be expected always to know or ascertain the precise scope of a particular picketing operation.
109. Cf. A. Cox, supra note 77, at 45 ("I wish that Justice Stevens had elaborated upon
'conduct' and 'deterrent.' When I pressed a similar argument upon the Court in [Tree Fruits),
counsel for the Teamsters Union exhibited photographs of the pickets; they were slightly built,
white-haired and gentle, elderly ladies. 'How,' he cried, 'did their conduct influence anyone
apart from the ideas expressed?' ").
110. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. Cf. Comment, Interdependent Parties, supra note 34, at 627 ("[O)n the facts of a case
such as Safeco ... [, w]hether consumers boycott the establishment or its sole product, the
effect on the secondary party will be the same. However, in a setting such as Tree Fruits where the struck product is but one of many the secondary sells - the Tree Fruits rule may
lead to far greater damage to the secondary party than would a successful strike of the primary
party.").
112. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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logically and constitutionally, on which to justify the section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibition. Consumer response to labor picketing is
no less reasoned, 113 and the effect on secondary businesses no less
harmful, 114 than that caused by competitive commercial advertising,
which the first amendment does protect. 115 Picketing deserves even
greater protection than commercial speech because it "is economically self-interested speech with a political dimension." 116 Where
picket lines are effective in persuading consumers to follow their appeal, it is not because they "have some mysterious and talismanic
significance, but because management has for the time being lost the
debate for the loyalties of the American public concerning labor disputes in general, or as to the particular labor dispute involved." 117
Some authorities have tried to distinguish picketing from other
forms of protected speech by labelling it "mere sloganeering" that
"involves no intellectual appeal, no exchange of ideas." 118 Justice
Stevens implies as much in his Safeco concurrence when he writes:
"Indeed, no doubt the principal reason why handbills containing the
same message are so much less effective than labor picketing is that
the former depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." 119
Although handbills may contain more detailed versions of the
messages displayed on picket signs, the constitutionality of a
message does not tum on its complexity. The Court has held that
slogans ("Live Free or Die") 120 and even epithets expressing political
views ("F - the Draft"), 121 are first amendment speech. 122 Similarly, " 'Unfair,' 'Scabs,' and 'Do Not Patronize' call for no more of a
Pavlovian response than the gaudy bumper stickers' 'Vote Democratic' and 'Vote Republican' . . . ." 123 Thus, the notion that pick113. See A. Cox, supra note 77, at 47.
114. See Dodd, supra note 22, at 514; Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note
23, at 960.
115. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
116. Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, at 1486.
117. BriefAmicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational Fund, Inc.
at 46-47, NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as NAACP Brief].
118. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892. See, e.g., Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56
HARV. L. REV. 180, 201, 202 (1942).
119. Sefeco, 441 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (right to refrain from speaking entitled
owner to cover state motto on car license plate).
121. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
122. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973) (civil service regulation prohibiting political activity interpreted to encompass buttons and bumper stickers might be
overbroad).
,
123. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892. Compare Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,
465 (1950) (''The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those
flowing from appeals by printed word."), with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
("(M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas
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eting produces an irrational response is a constitutionally insufficient
rationale for its control under the speech-plus doctrine.
Justice Harlan's second concern, that a picket line would tum
away customers wishing to avoid a confrontation with union members, is also an inadequate constitutional justification for regulation
of consumer picketing. As a practical matter, secondary businesses
are unlikely to be harmed by picketing perceived as coercive by customers. In part as a result of the more critical contemporary attitude
of the public toward labor unions, 124 coercive picketing may very
well produce a consumer backlash in response to the union's appeal.125 This point is particularly relevant because unions more
often use picketing as a publicity device than as an instrument of
economic coercion, 126 and thus will be careful to insure that their
message is favorably presented. Even if picketing did deter some
faint-hearted souls from approaching the secondary business, protection from mere embarrassment or annoyance has never been accorded constitutional status, 127 and thus does not justify curtailment
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as
well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force.").
124. See notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text.
125. In Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 106 P.2d 41 l (1940), the court quotes
from the American Federation of Labor as amicus curiae: " 'It may very well be . . . that the
public would choose to give the merchant the benefit of their custom in an even greater measure . . . in the case of a dispute in which the workers' position is unjust . . . .'" 16 Cal. 2d at
409, 106 P.2d at 413. Although the union's argument may have been somewhat disingenuous
at the time, it is not today. See Testing Labor's "Ultimate Weapon", Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1964,
at 50, 56 (During boycott of Judy Bond products, while some stores' sales fell by 20-40% below
the previous year's, one store's sales rose by 80%; "Clearly, [that store's] customers are indifferent if not antagonistic to the boycott."); cf. Church, Slinging Mud and Money, TIME, Nov. 15,
1982, at 43 (suggesting that candidates in 1982 elections perceived as having engaged in excessive mudslinging or campaign spending experienced a voter backlash).
An underlying explanation for this response is suggested by psychological reactance theory,
which posits that individuals will resist any attempt that they perceive as limiting their freedom of choice. See J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 3-15 (1966).
Brehm conducted an experiment in which he handed supermarket shoppers cards with
quarters attached as they entered the store. Half the cards politely requested the recipient to
purchase a particular loaf of bread on sale for 25 cents, the other half vehemently did so.
Seventy percent of those receiving polite cards purchased the bread, compared to only fifty
percent receiving vehement cards. The next day, on the theory that a bribe is perceived as an
attempt to limit choices that will trigger reactance, the experiment was repeated with an additional dime added to both cards. The rate of purchases dropped to forty percent for both
groups. J. BREHM, supra, at 82-90.
126. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
127. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) ("Speech
does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action."); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)
("Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the public aware of respondent's
real estate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the views and practices of
petitioners are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.''); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,
301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937) ("It is true that disclosure of the facts of the labor dispute may be
annoying to Senn even if the method and means employed in giving the publicity are inherently unobjectionable. But such annoyance, like that often suffered from publicity in other
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of freedom of speech. 128
As to Justice Harlan's third concern, an automatic association between a picket line in front of a secondary business and a primary
labor dispute is less likely and significant than it once may have
been. Although picketing may have been predominantly a labor tactic when the LMRDA was passed in 1959, the popularization of
mass picketing as a means of social protest has divorced the picket
line from its association with labor disputes. 129 Moreover, in part as
a result of the publicizing of union corruption 130 and a perception
that the nation's economic ills are attributable to "greedy" unions,1 31
public perceptions about unions have changed for the worse. 132 The
public today is much more likely than in times past to examine pickconnections, is not an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution."). See also St.
Antoine, supra note 8, at 891 ("[I]f the actions or the gestures of the pickets can properly be
classified as physically threatening or intimidating, then there is a problem in the law of assault, not the first amendment.").
128. See St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892-93 ("[W]hile one can sympathize with those who
resent being accosted by strangers with peremptory demands, or being forced to make decisions under the gaze of a beady pair of eyes, on balance, the existence of such mildly discomfiting social pressures should not outweigh the speaker's right to deliver the message in
person." (footnote omitted)).
129. See Raskin,supra note 107, at 17 ("[T]he real dent in popular acceptance of the 'never
cross' doctrine resulted . . . from the pirating of their technique by groups representing all
shades of political sentiment. Mass picketing demonstrations for everything from banning the
bomb to banning birth control have carried the process to a point of self-defeat."); St. Antoine,
supra note 8, at 892 ("[Picketing] may, indeed, have nothing to do with a labor dispute at all
but rather be the instrument for a racial group to protest segregation or cuts in welfare payments, or for a religious group to protest objectionable motion pictures." (footnote omitted));
note 86 supra.
130. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REC. 6668-70 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at
I 194-97 (remarks of Senators Curtis, Kennedy and McClellan concerning the Teamsters, racketeering and abuse of the secondary boycott); Bohlander & Werther, The Labor-Management
Reporting and .Disclosure Act Revisited, 30 LAB. L.J. 582, 583 (1979) (''The McClellan Committee, also known as the McClellan Anti-Racketeering Committee, captured the public's attention through widespread television and print coverage of union racketeering, corruption, and
other abuses in the labor-management field."); Raskin, supra note 107, at 16 (''The televised
Senate hearings on labor-management rackets in the late Fifties left indelible memories of the
frequency with which hoodlums hiding behind union buttons used strikes as vehicles of extortion or exploitation."). Bui see Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 Pun.
INTEREST, Fall 1979, at 69, 88 ("Many unions are alleged to be run by bosses or racketeers.
But while the monopoly view has been highly publicized, the vast majority of evidence appears
to support the voice view that unions generally are democratic political organizations and are
responsive to the will of their members.").
131. See Freeman_& Medoff, supra note 130, at 70.
132. In the 1930's and 1940's, unions were at the center of attention among intellectuals,
with most social scientists viewing them as an important positive force in society. In recent years, unionism has become a more peripheral topic and unions have come to be
viewed less positively. Less and less space in social-science journals and in magazines and
newspapers is devoted to unions. . . . And what is written is increasingly unfavorable.
The press often paints unions as organizations which are socially unresponsive, elitist,
nondemocratic, or ridden with crime.
Id. at 69-70. The decreased attention and public approval being received by unions does not
merely suggest that the picket line has lost its sanctity. It also indicates that if a union is to
reach the public with its message, it must earn public support.
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eters' messages with a critical eye before acceding to union appeals
for support. 133 Thus, Justice Harlan's fear that the public will confound primary and secondary labor disputes is not supported in fact,
much less in constitutional theory.
In the final analysis, the picket sign is merely a particularly effective means of reaching the public as well as attracting the media. It
is targeted specifically at those to whom its message is relevant; it
conveys the message quickly, boldly, and inexpensively; it reaches
those who might not otherwise have read a handbill, and does so
before they enter the business involved. 134 The mere fact that picketing may be a particularly persuasive method of conveying a
message does not justify its regulation. 135 Moreover, the alleged
availability of alternative means of communication 136 does not warrant removal of peaceful consumer picketing from the scope of first
amendment protection. 137 Secondary picketing is an important and
effective way for unions to publicize a primary labor dispute. The
government's interest in forestalling economic discord does not justify a flat prohibition of such picketing, even when it involves a dominant-product secondary.
133. See Raskin, supra note 107, at 12.
134. See NAACP Brief, supra note 117, at 43-44.
135. See First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (potentially disproportionate influence of corporate spending against referenda); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(potential for disproportionate influence through campaign spending); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214 (1966) (state regulation prohibiting election-day editorials); cf. Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm.n., 447 U.S. 557, 581 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The
justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may
find the utility's message persuasive."); Central Hudson, 441 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A]bsent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public."); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (''The claim that the expressions were intended to
exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First
Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activities;
this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper."); Mack & Lieberwitz,
supra note 12, at 816-17; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, 1493-94.
136. Compare Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 80 (Black, J., concurring) ("First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degree than by one fell swoop."), with 377 U.S. at
93 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (''The decision of Congress to prohibit secondary consumer picketing during labor disputes is, I believe, not inconsistent with the protections of the First Amendment, particularly when, as here, other methods of co=unication are left open.").
137. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place."), with Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 409, 106
P.2d 411, 413 (1940) ("Obviously, the establishment where a product is sold is the only effective point where the consumer may be told the facts concerning a labor controversy.").
The alternative means argument is least persuasive where the regulated mode of co=unication is co=only associated with the user and the best means available, as with labor picketing. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 525 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (co=ercial speech on billboards); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) ("For Sale" signs on real estate sites).
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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND NARROW CONSTRUCTION REHABILITATING SECTION 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)

The rules that have developed around section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) must
now be placed within a coherent statutory and constitutional framework. The Court has required that regulations limiting first amendment speech directly advance the interest involved and be no
broader than necessary to serve that interest. 138 Therefore, section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should be construed to minimize interference with secondary consumer picketing while at the same time carrying out the
congressional objective of protecting "neutral employers, employees
and consumers." 139 This Note suggests that the prohibitory language should only reach consumer picketing that (1) violates established "time, place and manner'' conduct restrictions, 140 or (2) causes
actual and significant economic loss to the secondary employer.
Three conduct restrictions, based on past Board and court decisions, balance the interests of unions and neutral parties in cases of
secondary consumer picketing. First, picketers should not physically
intimidate or obstruct customers of the secondary business. 141 This
rule actually furthers the union's purpose of gaining public support142 by minimizing potential consumer "backlash", 143 while protecting the neutral's business from undue interference.
Second, picketers should clearly identify the primary employer in
the dispute. 144 This rule furthers the union's objective of drawing
138. See notes 98-100 supra and acco·mpanying text.
139. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,618 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Although consumers deserve protection from physical coercion, their
right to receive information concerning the marketplace is an important one as well:
It was observed in Thornhill that "the practices in a single factory may have economic
repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing." ... As
to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent poltical
debate.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763
(1976).
140. The Court first explored this concept in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
See Kalven, supra note 22, at 25-27.
141. This rule should be subject to a simple factual inquiry with no presumptions of intent
or cause-and-effect. Compare Service & Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399, 136
N.L.R.B. 431 (1962) (intent to restrain and harass inferred from number of men patrolling),
with Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 808 (1979) (General Counsel's
argument for inference rejected since no evidence was presented that any customers were actually hindered).
142. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
144. This requirement is one that the Board has been imposing under its "vague signs"
doctrine. Thus, even a sign at a secondary site correctly identifying the primary employer, but
having the words, "On Strike," in much larger print than the rest, was held to create the
possibility of a misimpression to the casual passerby that the secondary employer was experiencing a strike. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 125 N.L.R.B. 531, 534-35 (1959).
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attention to the primary dispute, 145 but protects the secondary employer from the potentially harmful misimpression that it is involved
in a primary labor dispute.
Third, the picketers should limit their appeal to the extent practicable to the primary product. Although this rule is a mod!fied restatement of the Tree Fruits doctrine, this Note does not advocate it
on the basis of a phantom distinction in the legislative history. Its
purpose is to minimize economic harm to disinterested producers
selling products to the secondary as well as to the secondary itself,
while abolishing the "merged products" doctrine. That doctrine
covers cases in which a product or service provided by the primary
employer does not account for a large percentage of the secondary's
sales but has become fully integrated with products or services offered by the secondary. In these cases, courts have prohibited secondary picketing, reasoning that it would inevitably produce a total
boycott of the neutral's business. 146 However, secondary picketing is
designed to publicize primary disputes, not to harm secondary businesses, and rarely dissuades consumers from purchasing the struck
product. 147 Prohibiting picketing in these cases unduly inhibits the
ability of the union to carry its appeal to the public. 148 Therefore,
this Note proposes that picketing be permitted in merged product
cases, relying upon the actual harm rule to protect secondary
employers.
The actual harm rule still must be reconciled with the first
amendment doctrine of content-based discrimination, because it
does involve potential limitations upon speech. Labor picketing arguably is further from the "core" of first amendment values than
145. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 14 supra.
147. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941) (secondary picketing
of retail store by striking burglar alarm service workers). The court in Muller regarded its
decision in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937), as controlling. Justice
Brennan cited Goldjinger in Tree Fruits as one of the leading state cases establishing the distinction between limited and general secondary consumer picketing. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7.
The treatment of secondary picketing under the merged products doctrine differs sharply
from the treatment afforded handbilling in interpreting the producer-distributor relationship
entitled to protection under the publicity proviso of§ 8(b)(4). See Milk Drivers Local 537
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961), cited with approval in NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,
377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964) ("The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the
union's freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded. . . . It would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the proviso applied only
in situations where the union's labor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor."). Compare Local No. 662, Radio & Television Engrs., 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1705 (1961) (handbilling
of advertisers on struck radio station permitted, on theory that "radio station, by adding its
labor in form of capital, enterprise, and service to the automobiles which it advertises for the
secondary retail distributor of the automobiles, becomes one of the producers of the
automobiles" (emphasis added)), with Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401
F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (picketing of restaurant, an advertiser in struck newspaper,
disallowed, since product of primary employer is "advertising").
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political speech. 149 In its recent decisions, the Court has shown a
willingness to permit greater regulation of "non-political" than
"political" speech where a substantial governmental interest is
shown. 150 The actual and substantial harm rule is narrowly drawn
to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting neutral parties
149. Compare Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 3ll, 316 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), a.ffd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) ("[I]t may well be that the picketing in
this case is closer to the core notion of constitutionally protected free speech than the picketing
the Supreme Court has held may be banned."), with A. Cox, supra note 77, at 48 ("Requests
for immediate assistance in putting economic pressure upon one with whom the speaker is
engaged in driving a private business bargain are readily distinguishable from words looking
forward to political action.").
Professor Cox has suggested that Safeco "can be fitted into the body of first amendment
law if picketing is classified with commercial advertising as economic speech." A. Cox, supra
note 77, at 47. This approach, however, would not resolve the difficulties inherent in Safeco.
That case is inconsistent with the Court's commercial speech cases, such as Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See Note, Picketing and
Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 960 ("The Court's unwarranted deference to restrictions
on labor picketing stands in stark contrast to its exacting first amendment scrutiny of restric•
tions on commercial advertising."). Safeco is also inconsistent with nonlabor picketing cases
like Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). See
notes 82-84supra and accompanying text. Moreover, Professor Cox's approach focuses on the
subject rather than the mode of speech, labor disputes as opposed to labor picketing. Consequently, other modes oflabor speech, such as handbilling, would also experience a diminution
of constitutional status. Thus, the solution proposed by Professor Cox neither locates the "substantial government interest" essential at any level of first amendment analysis of regulation of
speech, nor provides the rationale with which to differentiate picketing from other modes of
expression. See also St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 904 ("It would be anomalous, at least, if the
recent extension of some constitutional safeguards to commercial advertising should be accompanied by their contraction in the case of union picketing." (footnote omitted)).
150. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3437 (1982) ("A massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and economic structure of a local
environment cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephem•
era! consequences of relatively few violent acts."), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67
( I980) ("Public-issue picketing, 'an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most
pristine and classic form,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963), has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of the First Amendment values."), with FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of an FCC regulation prohibiting broadcast of "profane" language) ("These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values [is
comparable to 'fighting words'.]" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1941))), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (upholding
zoning ordinances conditioning location of "adult theatres") ("[F]ew of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities'
exhibited in the theaters of our choice. . . . [T]he City must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."). See also Note, Picketing
and Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 947-49.
It is perhaps relevant to the problem of labor picketing that the regulations in Young and
Pac!fica were permitted not merely on the content of the speech, but on the content in the
context of the manner of presentation (explicit language on daytime radio, sexually explicit
materials purveyed through community storefronts). It does not excuse the Court's failure to
fulfill its " 'task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the
public interest allegedly served by the regulation,' " Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil•
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)). But,
perhaps it provides a starting point for analysis, when understood in conjunction with the
principle that, "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself and that law must
reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method." Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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involved in labor disputes. 151 Evidence of the effect of picketing on
secondary businesses suggests that the rule will be invoked infrequently.152 By narrowly applying section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in this manner, the courts can overcome the statutory and constitutional
complications inherent in Sefeco. The Sefeco decision, however,
will remain irreconcilable with any theory of first amendment jurisprudence as long as the Court ignores the realities of secondary consumer picketing. 153
CONCLUSION

Restrictions on secondary consumer picketing are based on assumptions that have never been subjected to serious scrutiny. Declines in union membership and bargaining power, changes in public
attitudes toward labor picketing, and expansion of first amendment
protections have been substantial since the passage of the LMRDA,
but have gone unacknowledged in the Supreme Court's application
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). As a result, the Court failed in Sefeco to
develop a coherent basis for its decision, because neither logic nor
precedent supports the fiat prohibition on dominant product secondary picketing that the Court announced.
An examination of secondary consumer picketing in light of contemporary realities demonstrates that the Court's decision in Sefeco
is not an incidental limitation on speech in furtherance of a substantial, clearly defined government interest. Rather, it is an overbroad
curtailment of speech that advances a speculative purpose in contravention of the policy balance struck by Congress. Even if the Court
is firmly convinced of the constitutionality of congressional limitations placed upon labor picketing for the protection of neutral parties, it cannot excuse the Board and the courts from reviewing the
facts of each case to ensure that the restriction is narrowly tailored to
its purpose. Whatever the reasonableness of the "delicate balance"
struck by Congress in devising section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in 1959, the
Court must recognize that both labor and the first amendment have
since entered a new era. Failure to reconcile the two in a principled
manner does measurable harm to each.

151. See Note, Picketing and Publicity, supra note 41, at 1281.
152. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
Secondary consumer boycotts have had their greatest success in smaller one- or two-industry union towns. See Cook, supra note 51, at 25; Testing Labor's 'Ultimate Weapon', Bus.
WEEK, July 25, 1964, at 52, 54. The influence of the union in these communities, however, is
so great that it minimizes the effect of a picketing injunction on the union's ability to publicize
a dispute.
153. See St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 903 ("Because the Supreme Court has the last word
on the Constitution, its fiats prevail. Yet, without a principled foundation, they tend not to
endure. . . . In all probability, we have not seen the end of this debate.").

